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Abstract
A new static analysis is proposed for programming languages with access control based on stack
inspection. This analysis allows for various security-aware program optimizations. A novel feature
of our static analysis is that it is parametric with respect to the security policy in force, so it needs
not to be recomputed when the access rights are dynamically updated.
Keywords: Language-based security, Access control,
Static analysis, Compiler optimizations
1 Introduction
Programming applications over wide area networks has emphasized issues that
had received less priority when working over local area networks. One of
these issues concerns security. In a wide area network no central authority
can deﬁne and enforce policies which regulate accesses to resources. Applica-
tions are designed to be executed and interoperate with potentially malicious
and untrusted components, e.g. components originated from diﬀerent, possi-
bly unknown, administration domains. Typically, components are developed
and maintained by diﬀerent providers and may be downloaded and linked to-
gether “on demand”. At run-time, systems interleave computational activities
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with meta-programming activities, such as dynamic linking, assembling and
customization of libraries, that permit to reconﬁgure the application without
having to restart it.
Security-aware programming languages, such as Java and C, have intro-
duced programmable authorization-based models to determine when a prin-
cipal can access a resource. These languages take access control decisions by
inspecting the run-time call stack. A permission is granted, provided that it
belongs to all the principals on the call stack. The so-called privileged opera-
tions are an exception: they are allowed to execute any code granted to their
principal, regardless of the calling sequence. This access control mechanism is
known as stack inspection.
Traditionally, stack inspection has been implemented with the lazy evalua-
tion strategy: the call stack is only retrieved and inspected when access control
tests are performed. This strategy has some drawbacks. First, the run-time
overhead due to the analysis of stack frames may grow very high. Second,
stack inspection deeply aﬀects those interprocedural program transformations
(i.e. method inlining) that may alter the structure of the call stack.
Another evaluation strategy for stack inspection is the eager one: the
access control context is updated at each method call (and return). However,
since security checks are statistically less frequent than cross-domain calls,
production implementations prefer to adopt the lazy strategy.
A large amount of papers [2,3,4,6,9,10,12,17,21,28] witnesses the interest
towards formally understanding and optimizing stack inspection. All these ap-
proaches share a basic assumption: the binding between code and permissions
is made at class-loading time, and it cannot be modiﬁed at run-time.
However, starting from version 1.4.1, the Java security architecture allows
for dynamic security policies: the binding between a class and its permissions
can be deferred until the class is involved in an access control test. Still, the
static binding of permissions is allowed.
In this paper, we introduce a new static analysis for stack inspection,
improving over previous analyses of ours, see e.g. [3]. Our present proposal is
speciﬁcally designed to tackle the issues raised by dynamic security policies.
We represent programs by control ﬂow graphs, an idealized model not tied
to any particular language. These graphs are extracted from actual bytecode
through available control ﬂow analyses; they feature primitive constructs for
method invocation, exceptions, and access control based on stack inspection.
Our analysis takes as input a control ﬂow graph, and computes an abstract
graph, whose nodes are pairs 〈n, γ〉 and edges are labelled by ϕ, where:
• n is a method invocation or return, or an access control test;
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• γ is an access control context, i.e. the set of protection domains visited after
the last privileged call (if any);
• ϕ is a traversability condition for the edge.
The traversability conditions are used to associate each abstract node 〈n, γ〉
with a predicate Φ(n, γ), telling which conditions the security policy must
satisfy in order for the node to be reachable.
We prove our static analysis correct with respect to the operational seman-
tics of control ﬂow graphs: if the actual security policy allows for an execution
leading to node n with access control context γ, then there exists a node 〈n, γ〉
in the abstract graph, and the security policy satisﬁes the condition Φ(n, γ).
A signiﬁcant novelty of our approach is that the static analysis is para-
metric with respect to the security policy in force, hence it needs not to be
recomputed each time the access rights are modiﬁed.
Our static analysis provides a formal support for some security-aware op-
timizations. In particular, we can detect (and remove):
• the redundant checks in a program, i.e. the checks which always pass;
• the dead code, which cannot be reached due to security restrictions;
• the inlineable method calls, i.e. those calls which can be safely replaced by
a copy of the called method.
Indeed, method inlining can lead to dramatic performance improvements,
for the following reasons. First, it reduces the overhead of dynamic dispatch-
ing; second, it allows the just-in-time optimizers to work on larger blocks of
code, so making standard intraprocedural optimizations more eﬀective.
Our static analysis establishes conditions on the security policy which en-
sure when these optimizations are valid.
2 Program model
We model programs as control ﬂow graphs (CFGs for short) whose nodes
represent access control tests, method invocations and returns, and whose
edges represent the ﬂow of control. We also consider a basic exception handling
mechanism, with only one type of exceptions, no nested try blocks and no
finally clauses. We do not deﬁne how CFGs are extracted from actual
programs: this construction is well understood and algorithms and tools exist
for it; see for example [14,19,26,27]. A full treatment of exceptions requires a
tailored construction of the CFG, e.g. by the techniques presented in [8,23].
CFGs hide any data ﬂow information, and are therefore approximated;
typically, the conditional construct is rendered as non-deterministic choice.
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This approximation is safe, in the sense that any actual execution ﬂow is
represented by a path in the CFG. However, the converse may not be true:
some paths may exist which do not correspond to any actual execution. For
instance, both branches of an “if” statement are represented, even in the cases
when the same branch is always taken at run-time.
Dynamic dispatching in object-oriented languages is another source of ap-
proximation. When a program invokes a method on an object O, the run-time
environment has to choose among the various implementations of that method.
The decision is based on the actual class O belongs to, which is unpredictable
at static time. To be safe, CFGs over-approximate the set of methods that
can be invoked at each program point.
2.1 Syntax
LetD be a ﬁnite set of protection domains, and P be a ﬁnite set of permissions.
Definition 2.1 A CFG 〈N,E,Dom,Priv〉 is an oriented graph, where:
• N is the set of nodes. Each n ∈ N is associated with a label (n), describing
the control ﬂow primitive represented by the node. Labels give rise to three
kinds of nodes: call nodes, representing method invocation, return nodes,
which represent return from a method, and check(P ) nodes, testing whether
the permission P is granted by the security policy or not. A distinguished
element nε ∈ N plays the technical role of a single, isolated entry point.
• E ⊆ N × (N \ nε) is the set of edges. There are three kinds of edges: call
edges n −→ n′, which model interprocedural ﬂow, transfer edges n  n′,
which correspond to sequencing, and catch edges n n
′, which correspond
to exception handling. The last two kinds represent intraprocedural ﬂow.
• Dom : N → D is a mapping from nodes to protection domains.
• Priv : N → Bool tells whether a node enables its privileges or not.
Each CFG is associated with a security policy Perm : D → 2P , which
grants a set of permissions to each protection domain. The following treatment
does not require security policies to be ﬁxed over time. Hereafter, we will
always abbreviate Perm(Dom(n)) with Perm(n).
Definition 2.2 The methods of a control ﬂow graph 〈N,E〉 are the connected
components of the undirected graph 〈N,E ′〉, where E ′ is the symmetric closure
of the set of intraprocedural edges in E. We call µ(n) the method to which
node n belongs. The entry points of µ(n) are deﬁned as:
ε(µ(n)) = {m ∈ µ(n) | ∃n′ ∈ N. n′ −→ m }
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2.2 Semantics
The operational semantics of CFGs is deﬁned by a transition system, whose
conﬁgurations are call stacks. Moreover, each state has a boolean tag which
tells whether an exception is active (i.e. thrown and not caught yet). If no
exception is active, a state is represented as sequence of nodes enclosed in
square brackets: for example, σ = [n0, . . . , nk] is a state whose top node is nk.
If an exception is active, we append the symbol  to the sequence of nodes,
i.e. σ abbreviates 〈σ, true〉. Pushing a node n on a stack σ is written as σ : n.
The access control context of a state is deﬁned as the set of protection
domains visited after the last privileged call (if any). Notice that, in what
follows, we will write x for a singleton set {x}, when unambiguous.
Definition 2.3 We deﬁne the access control context Γ(σ) of a state σ as:
Γ([]) = ∅ Γ(σ : n) = Γ(σ)↑n
where, for each context γ and n ∈ N , we deﬁne:
γ ↑n =
{
Dom(n) if Priv(n)
γ ∪Dom(n) otherwise
Stack inspection is modeled by the minimal relation induced by the in-
ference rules for the predicate 
 below. The set of permissions granted to a
state is just the intersection of the permissions associated to its access control
context. We prefer to formalize stack inspection using a double indirection
with access control contexts and permissions, because our static analysis will
be independent from the security policy in force.
Definition 2.4 We say that a permission P is granted to a state σ under the
security policy Perm iﬀ Γ(σ) 
Perm P , where:
P ∈ Perm(D)
D 
Perm P
γ 
Perm P γ
′ 
Perm P
γ ∪ γ′ 
Perm P
The transition relation  between states is deﬁned in Table 1. A trace on
〈G,Perm〉 is a derivation 〈σ0, χ0〉  · · ·  〈σk, χk〉. An entry trace is a trace
where σ0 = [nε] and χ0 = false. The reachability relation  states when there
is an entry trace on 〈G,Perm〉 which can lead to a given state:
〈G,Perm〉 [nε]
〈G,Perm〉 σ σ  σ′
〈G,Perm〉 σ′
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(n) = call n −→ n′
σ : n σ : n : n′
[call ]
(m) = return n  n′
σ : n : m σ : n′
[return ]
(n) = check(P ) Γ(σ : n) 
Perm P n  n′
σ : n σ : n′
[pass ]
n n
′
σ : n σ : n′
[catch ]
(n) = check(P ) Γ(σ : n) 
Perm P
σ : n σ : n
[fail ]
n 
σ : n σ
[propagate ]
Table 1
Operational semantics of CFGs.
2.3 Well-formed CFGs
We require our CFGs to obey some mild well-formedness constraints. We say
that a CFG is well-formed iﬀ, for each n, n′ ∈ N \ nε:
(n) = check(P ) =⇒  ∃n′ ∈ N. n −→ n′ (1a)
(n) = return =⇒  ∃n′ ∈ N. 〈n, n′〉 ∈ E (1b)
| ε(µ(n)) | = 1 (1c)
µ(n) = µ(n′) =⇒ Dom(n) = Dom(n′) (1d)
Priv(n) =⇒ (n) = call (1e)
n  n′ ∨ n n
′ =⇒ n′ = ε(µ(n)) (1f)
µ(nε) = nε (1g)
Constraints (1a) and (1b) ensure, respectively, that check nodes have no out-
going call edges and that return nodes do not have outgoing edges at all.
Constraint (1c) states that each method has exactly one entry point. Af-
ter this constraint, we abbreviate n −→ ε(µ(m)) with n −→ µ(m). Con-
straint (1d) says that nodes in the same method are in the same protection
domain. Note that constraints (1a)–(1d) reﬂect some peculiarities of Java-like
bytecode: hence, CFGs extracted from bytecode always satisfy them. The
other constraints are only technical, and help keeping the deﬁnition of our
analysis short: (1e) says that only call nodes can be privileged; (1f) that in-
traprocedural and interprocedural edges do not overlap; (1g) states that the
entry point nε has no outgoing intraprocedural ﬂow (therefore, it only makes
sense to have nε as a call node).
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2.4 Adequacy of the model
We brieﬂy discuss some of the diﬀerences between our model and the Java
security model [13]. Similar considerations hold for the .NET model [22].
• Java allows for the dynamic instantiation of permissions (e.g. an application
that asks the user for a ﬁle name and then tries to open that ﬁle). Such
parametric permissions are of the form P (x), where x ranges over the set
of possible targets for the permissions of class P .
• in Java, a new thread upon creation inherits the access control context of its
parent. When stack inspection is performed, both the context of the current
thread and the contexts of all its ancestors are examined. In this way, a
child thread cannot obtain an access which is not granted to its ancestors.
• our model only allows for code-centric security policies: permissions are
granted to code according to its source, regardless of who is running it.
JAAS [18], extends the Java security model by enabling user-centric access
control policies, based on the principal who actually runs the code. Permis-
sions can be granted to principals, and the doAs method allows a piece of
code to be executed on behalf of a given subject. This is done by associating
the (authenticated) subject running the code with the current access con-
trol context. Stack inspection ensures that subjects are taken into account
when access control is performed (see e.g. [15] for a formal speciﬁcation).
• we do not model some advanced features like reﬂection and native methods.
Also, we do not consider the side eﬀects of some “dangerous” permissions
(e.g. AllPermission, which may even breach the whole security system by
replacing the JVM system binaries). Besides deeply aﬀecting security, these
features reduce the eﬀectiveness of any analysis which aims at determining
statically the permissions granted to running code.
3 The Security Context Analysis
Given a CFG G = 〈N,E,Dom,Priv〉, our static analysis computes an abstract
graph G = 〈N , E〉 taking into account the evolution of the security contexts
in the traces of G. An abstract node n ∈ N  is a triple 〈n, γ, χ〉 (abbreviated
as nγχ when unambiguous). Intuitively, it represents a call stack with top
node n, access control context γ and exception ﬂag χ. An abstract edge
n
ϕ
−→ m models an execution that can ﬂow from n to m if the security policy
in force satisﬁes the condition ϕ. The root of G is nε = 〈nε,Dom(nε), false〉.
Our analysis is speciﬁed by the inference rules in Table 2. The abstract
graph is constructed starting from the root, and then applying the inference
rules to obtain new abstract edges and nodes. Technically, this is a forward,
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(n) = call n −→ n′ nγ ∈ N 
nγ −→ n′(γ ↑n ∪Dom(n′))
[call]
nγ ∈ N  n m
nγ −→ mγ
[catch]
(n) = check(P ) nγ ∈ N  n  m
nγ
γ P
−−−→ mγ
[pass]
(n) = check(P ) nγ ∈ N 
nγ
γ P
−−−→ nγ
[fail]
(n′) = return n  m nγ ϕ n
′γ′
nγ
ϕ
−→ mγ
[return]
nγ ϕ n
′γ′ n′ 
nγ
ϕ
−→ nγ
[propagate]
Table 2
Abstract semantics of control ﬂow graphs.
monotone control ﬂow analysis. The nodes are in N × 2D × Bool , and the
edges are in (N × 2D × Bool)2 × 2(2
D×P). Since N , D and P are ﬁnite, then
the abstract graph is ﬁnite, too.
Before explaining the rules in Table 2, it is convenient to introduce some
terminology and notation. First, we deﬁne the notion of paths over abstract
CFGs (deﬁnition 3.1). Deﬁnition 3.3 is used to determine which abstract
returns (and exception propagations) match abstract calls. This allows us
to single out paths that model “valid” abstract executions. Deﬁnition 3.2
introduces the concepts of traversability and reachability. Intuitively, a path
is traversable under a security policy if the policy satisﬁes all the conditions
on the path edges. An abstract node is reachable under the policy if there
exists a path leading to that node which is traversable under the policy.
Definition 3.1 A path from n0 to n

k in G
 is a sequence n0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕk−→ nk
where, for each i ∈ 1..k, ni−1
ϕi−→ ni ∈ E
. We denote with Π(n, m) the set
of all paths from n to m, and with Π(n) the set of all paths from nε to n
.
We write Π(G) to denote all the paths in the abstract graph G.
Definition 3.2 Let n ∈ N  and π = n0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕk−→ nk. We deﬁne:
Φ(n) =
∨
π∈Π(n)
Φ(π) Φ(π) =
∧
i=1..k
ϕi
By convention, Φ(n) = false if n ∈ N , and Φ(π) = true if π = [].
Definition 3.3 Let nγ, n′γ′χ′ ∈ N . We write nγ ϕ n
′γ′χ′ when n −→ µ(n′),
γ′ = (γ ↑ n) ∪ Dom(n′), and there exists a path from ε(µ(n′))γ′ to n′γ′χ′ s.t.
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w(π) = 0 and Φ(π) = ϕ. The weight of paths and edges in G are deﬁned as:
w(π) =
|π|∑
i=1
w(π[i− 1] −→ π[i]) w(nγχ −→ n′γ′χ′) =
{
1 if n −→ n′
0 otherwise
Constraint (1f) guarantees that abstract edges representing interprocedural
ﬂow have unit weight, while intraprocedural ones have null weight. This con-
straint could be removed by labelling the abstract edges with their weight.
We now introduce the “concrete” counterpart of deﬁnition 3.2 above. The
traversability condition on a trace is the conjunction of the (unevaluated)
access control tests encountered. We formally relate the traversability of paths
to that of traces in Theorem 3.6.
Definition 3.4 Given a trace τ = σ0χ0 1 · · ·k σkχk, we deﬁne:
Φ(τ) =
∧
i=1..k Φ(σi−1χi−1 i σiχi)
Φ(σ : n, χ σ
′χ′) =


Γ(σ : n) 
 P if (n) = check(P ),  = pass
Γ(σ : n) 
 P if (n) = check(P ),  = fail
true otherwise
We here provide some intuition about the rules in Table 2. Consider call
ﬁrst. If there is a call from node n to n′, and the access control context before
the call is γ, then the context after the call comprises the protection domain
of n′, plus either that of n if n is privileged, or γ if not. The rule pass says
that, if a node n tests for permission P in the context γ, there is an edge
labelled γ 
 P leading to m and preserving the context. Similarly, the rule
fail says that there is an edge γ 
 P leading to an exception. The rule return
states that, if n′ is a return and there is a call node n with context γ that
matches the return node (see deﬁnition 3.3 below), then there is an edge from
n to m while preserving the context γ. The rule propagate states that, if the
call n with context γ can match a node n′ while throwing an exception, then
the exception is propagated to n.
Practical considerations suggest us that the size of an abstract graph does
not grow exponentially, but it is actually linear in the number of nodes of the
original CFG. In particular:
• the exponential factor 2D above only occurs when the number of protection
domains is proportional to the number of nodes. Actually, the number of
protection domains can be considered as a constant, because it depends on
static properties of the loaded code (i.e. code origin and digital signatures).
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• each security check gives rise to a bifurcation in the abstract graph. Then,
our approximation to the number of abstract nodes hides an exponential
factor in the number of checks. However, the number of security checks
in CFGs is usually small: indeed, access control tests are only inserted to
guard methods accessing critical resources.
• when some protection domain is statically bound to permissions by the
security policy, it is sometimes possible to partially evaluate the conditions
on the abstract edges. In particular, an edge labelled γ 
 P can be removed
when, for some D ∈ γ with static permissions, P is not granted to D.
Definition 3.5 Let Perm be a security policy. We deﬁne:
Perm |= true
Perm |= (γ 
 P ) ⇐⇒ γ 
Perm P
Perm |= ϕ ∧ ϕ′ ⇐⇒ Perm |= ϕ and Perm |= ϕ′
Perm |= ϕ ⇐⇒ it is not the case that Perm |= ϕ
The following theorem states that our analysis is sound w.r.t. the opera-
tional semantics of CFGs: for each execution trace in G, there exists a corre-
sponding path in G mimicking the evolution of the access control contexts.
Theorem 3.6 (Soundness) Let 〈G,Perm〉τ = [nε]· · ·〈σ : n, χ〉. Then,
there exists a path π ∈ Π(〈n,Γ(σ) ∪Dom(n), χ〉) such that Φ(π) = Φ(τ).
The next theorem states that our analysis is also complete: for each path
in G and security policy Perm that satisﬁes its reachability condition, there
exists a corresponding execution trace in 〈G,Perm〉. This fact should not seem
bizarre: indeed, completeness is only up to the precision of the CFG, which is
a safe, approximated model of the analyzed program.
Theorem 3.7 (Completeness) Let π ∈ Π(nγχ) and Perm be such that
Perm |= Φ(π). Then, there exist τ, σ such that 〈G,Perm〉  τ  〈σ : n, χ〉,
γ = Γ(σ) ∪Dom(n) and Φ(τ  〈σ : n, χ〉) = Φ(π).
Our analysis supports a form of incremental computation, though not in a
fully compositional way. This is particularly useful for dynamic linking of code
– the mechanism which allows a program to be extended at run-time. Our
program model does not directly support this feature: so we require the CFG
construction algorithm to correctly link the relevant CFGs, e.g. as in [24].
Indeed, this operation cannot be performed by looking at the CFGs alone,
because CFGs do not carry enough information to restrict the set of targets
of dynamically dispatched method invocations.
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We brieﬂy show how the incremental computation of the analysis is per-
formed. Assume we have a computed G, when the CFG G′ is loaded. The
CFG construction algorithm singles out the set E˜ of resolved edges between
G and G′, i.e. those call edges n −→ m such that n,m do not belong both to
the same CFG. The linked graph G 
E˜ G
′ contains the nodes and the edges
from both G and G′, plus the resolved edges E˜.
To obtain (G 
E˜ G
′) from G, it suﬃces to compute the closure of the set
of rules in Table 2, starting from the set of resolved edges and from the entry
point of G′. Note that adding new executable traces to a CFG never aﬀects
the analysis of the old ones.
4 Program Transformations
In this section we show that our static analysis provides us with an eﬀective
basis for several code optimizations. This is not a trivial task, because per-
forming interprocedural optimizations in the presence of stack inspection may
break security. Indeed, stack inspection deeply relies on the structure of the
call stack, which may be altered by such optimizations.
All the program transformations below have to be revalidated every time
that the security policy is updated. This form of dynamic deoptimization
is common practice in the presence of just-in-time compilers, e.g. the Java
HotSpot Compiler [25]. Again, note that our analysis need not be recomputed.
4.1 Elimination of the redundant checks
The ﬁrst application of our analysis detects the redundant checks occurring
in a program, i.e. those which always pass, regardless of the execution trace.
Definition 4.1 Let (n) = check(P ). We say that n is redundant w.r.t. a
security policy Perm when, for each call stack σ:
〈G,Perm〉 σ : n =⇒ Γ(σ : n) 
Perm P
The following theorem states conditions to recognize redundant checks,
so enabling the compiler to safely remove them from the code. Actually,
redundant checks can only be disabled in the presence of dynamic linking,
because loading a new method may add new traces where the permission is
no longer granted.
Theorem 4.2 A check node n is redundant w.r.t. a security policy Perm if
and only if Perm |= Φ(nγ) for all contexts γ.
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The reachability condition Φ(nγ) can be computed during the costruction
of the abstract graph. This requires accumulating the traversability conditions
on the edges leading to abstract check nodes.
4.2 Dead code elimination
Dead code elimination is a program transformation which allows the compiler
to discard unreachable or useless pieces of code. This optimizazion reduces
both the size of the generated bytecode and the total application running time
(e.g. when code has to be downloaded from the network).
The following theorem allows to detect (and remove) those methods which
cannot be reached due to security restrictions:
Theorem 4.3 Let n = ε(µ(n)). If Perm |= Φ(nγ) for all nγ ∈ G, then there
are no σ and m ∈ µ(n) such that 〈G,Perm〉 σ : m.
4.3 Method inlining
Method inlining is an optimization that replaces a method invocation with a
copy of the called method code. As a side eﬀect, the protection domain of
the inlined method is ignored when performing stack inspection. Our analysis
gives us the means to compute the set of method invocations that can be
safely inlined. Intuitively, a method invocation can be inlined if the outcome
of the security checks is not aﬀected by ignoring the protection domain of the
inlined method.
We adopt the so-called original version inlining approach [16], which al-
ways considers the original version of the callee and the current version of the
caller when performing inlinings. This can be obtained by duplicating the
original code of the inlined method. Let n˙ be the node candidate for inlining,
and n˙ −→ n′. We assume that the method invocation represented by n˙ can
be statically dispatched, i.e. it has exactly one callee, represented by µ(n′).
We also require that the protection domain of µ(n′) is isolated in the CFG,
i.e. its name is diﬀerent from the other domain names (it suﬃces to assign to
Dom(n′) a fresh name).
We formally specify in deﬁnition 4.4 when a method invocation can be
safely inlined. The condition (2a) below guarantees static dispatching of n˙, as
well as that n˙ is not a recursive call (otherwise inlining makes little sense). The
condition (2b) says that there is a single callee: this is enforced by the original
version inlining approach. The condition (2c) ensures that the protection
domain of n˙ is isolated. These conditions, apart from n˙ being not recursive,
can easily be satisﬁed, as noted above. The key condition is (2d): it guarantees
that, for all the permissions that can be possibly checked after the inlined call,
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the security policy agrees on the protection domains of n˙ and n′.
Definition 4.4 We say that n˙ −→ n′ is inlineable in G w.r.t. Perm iﬀ:
n˙ −→ n =⇒ n = n′ ∧ n /∈ µ(n˙) (2a)
n −→ n′ =⇒ n = n˙ (2b)
n /∈ µ(n′) =⇒ Dom(n) = Dom(n′) (2c)
n˙γ⇒mγ′
(m) = check(P )
Dom(n′) ∈ γ′


=⇒ P ∈ Perm(n˙) ⇐⇒ P ∈ Perm(n′) (2d)
hold for all n,m, γ, γ′, ϕ. We write n˙γ⇒ n′γ′χ′ when:
∃π, n′′, γ′′. n˙γ −→ n′′γ′′ ∧ π ∈ Π(n′′γ′′, n′γ′χ′)
Next, we deﬁne the eﬀect of the method inlining transformation on CFGs.
Instead of substituting n˙ for µ(n′) and adjusting the edges accordingly, we
equivalently operate on the semantics of the transformed CFG. The eﬀect of
the inlining of n˙ on call stacks is speciﬁed by the function inl n˙ in Table 3.
Given a state σ, inl n˙(σ) is obtained by removing all the occurrences of n˙ in
σ (except when n˙ is in top position). The operational semantics of a CFG
after the inlining of n˙ is deﬁned by the transition relation n˙ in Table 3.
For instance, the rules n˙call1 and 
n˙
call2 state, respectively, that a method
invocation proceeds as usual when the calling node is not n˙, otherwise n˙ is
removed from the call stack.
Definition 4.5 Let G = 〈N,E,DomG,PrivG〉. The n˙-inlined version of G is
G˙ = 〈N,E,DomG˙,PrivG˙〉, where:
PrivG˙(n) =
{
PrivG(n˙) if n˙ −→ µ(n)
PrivG(n) otherwise
DomG˙(n) =
{
DomG(n˙) if n˙ −→ µ(n)
DomG(n) otherwise
The following theorem states the correctness of method inlining: each trace
in the original CFG corresponds to a trace in the n˙-inlined version of the CFG.
Theorem 4.6 If n˙ is inlineable in G w.r.t. Perm, then:
〈G,Perm〉 τ ⇐⇒ 〈G˙,Perm〉n˙ inl n˙(τ)
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inl n˙([ ]) = []
[inl1]
inl n˙(σ) = σ˙ top(σ) = n˙
inl n˙(σ : n
′) = σ˙ : n′
[inl2]
inl n˙(σ) = σ˙
inl n˙(σ : n˙ : n
′) = σ˙ : n′
[inl3]
(n) = call n −→ n′ n = n˙
σ : n n˙ σ : n : n′
[call1 ]
(n˙) = call n˙ −→ n′
σ : n˙ n˙ σ : n′
[call2 ]
(n′) = return n  m n˙ −→ µ(n′)
σ : n : n′ n˙ σ : m
[return1 ]
n  n˙ −→ µ(n′)
σ : n n˙ σ
[propagate1 ]
(n′) = return n˙  m n˙ −→ µ(n′)
σ : n′ n˙ σ : m
[return2 ]
n  n˙ −→ µ(n′)
σ : n n˙ σ : n˙
[propagate2 ]
Table 3
Eﬀect of inlining n˙ on call stacks (top) and transitions (bottom).
5 Conclusions and related work
We have developed a technique to perform program transformations in the
presence of stack inspection and dynamic security policies. The technique
relies on the deﬁnition of our Security Context Analysis. The analysis is
sound and complete with respect to the control ﬂow graphs derived from the
bytecode (recall from Section 2 that these graphs safely approximate the actual
behavior). Our analysis makes various optimizations possible. We focussed
here on elimination of redundant checks and of dead code, and on method
inlining. It is worthwhile noting that our analysis can take advantage of the
control ﬂow graphs generated by the just-in-time optimizers, e.g. the HotSpot
compilers embedded in the latest Java Virtual Machines [25]. This would also
make our technique directly exploitable by these tools, e.g. to produce larger
methods by inlining, so allowing for further optimizations.
Many authors advocated the use of static techniques in order to understand
and optimize stack inspection, among them ourselves [2,3,4,5]. As far as we
can tell, our current proposal is the ﬁrst one that can deal with dynamic
security policies.
Besson, Jensen, Le Me`tayer and Thorn [7] formalize classes of security
properties through a linear-time temporal logic. They show that a large class
of policies (including stack inspection) can be expressed in this formalism.
Model checking is then used to prove that local security checks enforce a given
global security policy. Their veriﬁcation method is based on the translation
from linear-time temporal formulae to deterministic ﬁnite-state automata, and
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it can be used to optimize stack inspection. Based on the same model, [6]
develops a static analysis that computes, for each method, the set of its secure
calling contexts with respect to a given global property. When a method is
invoked from a secure calling context, its execution never violates the global
property. For some optimizations, e.g. for method inlining, this technique is
even too powerful, as the information about calling contexts is unnecessary.
Esparza, Kucˇera and Schwoon [11] formalize stack inspection in terms of
model checking pushdown systems. Obdrzˇa´lek [20] uses the same technique to
accurately model Java exception handling. A suitable combination of the two
will then be an alternative approach to ours. Since our model is speciﬁcally
tailored on stack inspection, we think that our analysis may be implemented
and exploited more eﬃciently than a general method such as model checking
pushdown systems.
Exploiting the access control logic of [1], Wallach, Appel and Felten [28]
propose an alternative semantics of eager stack inspection, called security-
passing style. This technique consists of tracking the security state of an
execution as an additional parameter of each method invocation. This allows
for interprocedural compiler optimizations that do not interfere with stack
inspection (at the cost of more expensive method calls).
Pottier, Skalka and Smith [21] address the problem of stack inspection in
λsec, a typed lambda calculus enriched with primitive constructs for enforcing
security checks and managing permissions, and no exception handling. Stack
inspection never fails on a well typed program, because the set of permissions
granted at run-time always includes the security context. This analysis sup-
ports all-or-nothing optimizations that remove the security manager when all
the checks are redundant. Instead, we can single out and remove individual
redundant checks.
Fournet and Gordon [12] investigate the problem of establishing the cor-
rectness of program transformations in the presence of stack inspection. They
present an equational theory, together with a coinductive proof technique, for
the λsec calculus. They study how stack inspection aﬀects program behavior,
proving that certain function inlinings and tail-call eliminations are correct.
The equational theory is used to reason on the (somewhat limited) security
properties actually guaranteed by stack inspection. Here, we are more con-
cerned with eﬃcient (semantically-based) optimization procedures to be used
on the ﬁeld, rather than with a general reasoning framework. Indeed, it is
unclear how to (mechanically) derive a procedure (e.g. a conﬂuent terminat-
ing rewriting system) to ensure correctness of program transformations under
security constraints.
Koved, Pistoia and Kershenbaum [17] address the problem of computing
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the set of permissions a class needs in order to execute without throwing se-
curity exceptions. Also this analysis suﬀers from allowing only all-or-nothing
optimizations, as in [21]. The analysis is built over access rights invocation
graphs. These ﬂow graphs are context-sensitive: each node is associated also
with its calling context, i.e. with its target method, receiver and parameters
values. In this way, the analysis in [17] can deal with parametric permissions
and multi-threading. Our approach can gain precision through the exploita-
tion of these graphs. We plan to study this issue in future work.
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A Proofs
Definition A.1 Consider a trace τ on the following form:
σ0 χ0 0 σ1 χ1 1 · · · k−1 σk χk
For each i, j ∈ 0..k, we write iτ j iﬀ:
i = call ∧ i = max{ h ∈ 0..j − 1 | w(τ, h, j) = 1 }
For each 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ k, the weight of the trace τ [i..j] is deﬁned as follows:
w(τ, i, j) =
j−1∑
h=i
w(h)
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where the weight of a transition with label  is deﬁned as:
w() =


1 if  = call
−1 if  = return or  = propagate
0 otherwise
Lemma A.2 Let τ = [nε] · · · 〈σ : n : n
′, χ〉 be a trace of length k. Then:
n −→ µ(n′) (A.1a)
∃i ∈ 0..k − 1. τ [i] = σ : n ∧ iτ k (A.1b)
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of the trace. The base case
k = 0 holds trivially, because σ0 = [nε] does not satisfy the premises of
the lemma. For the inductive case, assume (A.1a) and (A.1b) are true for
all traces of length lower than k. Case analysis on the rule used to deduce
σk−1χk−1  σkχk gives:
• case [call ]:
(n) = call n −→ n′
σ : n σ : n : n′
Here (A.1a) follows by the fact that n −→ n′, and the index i which satisﬁes
(A.1b) is just k − 1.
• case [return]:
(m) = return m′  n′
σ : n : m′ : m σ : n : n′
By the induction hypothesis, we have that:
∃j ∈ 0..k − 2. σjχj = 〈σ : n : m
′, false〉 (A.2)
Since any derivation for σ : n : m′ requires at least one step, j > 0. Then,
the induction hypothesis on j − 1 gives n −→ µ(m′), and:
∃i ∈ 0..j − 1. σiχi = 〈σ : n, false〉 (A.3)
Since m′  n′, it follows that µ(m′) = µ(n′). Then, n −→ µ(m′) implies
n −→ µ(n′). This proves (A.1a), and (A.1b) is satisﬁed by the index i
in (A.3).
• case [pass ]:
(m′) = check(P ) Γ(σ : n : m′) 
Perm P m
′  n′
σ : n : m′  σ : n : n′
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By the induction hypothesis, n −→ µ(m′), and:
∃i ∈ 0..k − 2. σiχi = 〈σ : n, false〉 (A.4)
As in the previous case, µ(m′) = µ(m) implies that n −→ µ(n′), which
proves (A.1a). The index i given by (A.4) satisﬁes (A.1b).
• case [fail ]:
(n′) = check(P ) Γ(σ : n : n′) 
Perm P
σ : n : n′  σ : n : n′
Here (A.1a) and (A.1b) follow directly by the induction hypothesis.
• case [catch]:
m′ n
′
σ : n : m′ σ : n : n′
By the induction hypothesis, we have n −→ µ(m′), and:
∃i ∈ 0..k − 2. σiχi = 〈σ : n, false〉 (A.5)
Since m′ n
′, then µ(m′) = µ(n′). So, n −→ µ(m′) implies n −→ µ(n′),
which proves (A.1a). Equation (A.1b) is satisﬁed by the index i in (A.5).
• case [propagate]:
m′ 
σ : n : n′ : m′ σ : n : n′
By the induction hypothesis, we have that:
∃j ∈ 0..k − 2. σjχj = 〈σ : n : n
′, false〉 (A.6)
Since any derivation for σ : n : n′ requires at least one step, j > 0. Then,
the induction hypothesis on j − 1 gives n −→ µ(n′), and:
∃i ∈ 0..j − 1. σiχi = 〈σ : n, false〉
Definition A.3 Let τ = σ0χ0 1 · · ·k σkχk. We deﬁne the ﬂattening of τ
as (τ) = (τ, 0, k), where, for 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ k:
(τ, i, j) =


σjχj if i = j
(τ, i, h)
Φ(τ [h..j])
−−−−−→ σjχj if i ≤ hτ j − 1, w(j) = −1
(τ, i, j − 1)
Φ(τ [j−1..j])
−−−−−−−→ σjχj otherwise
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Lemma A.4 Let τ be a trace of length k, with (τ) = σ0χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕh−→ σhχh.
h ≤ k (A.7a)
σ0χ0 = τ [0], σhχh = τ [k] (A.7b)
Φ(τ) =
∧
i=0..h ϕi (A.7c)
Proof. We won’t go through the details of the proof for (A.7a) and (A.7b),
because they are immediate from deﬁnition A.3. The proof of (A.7c) is by
induction on the length of τ . If k = 0, then (τ) = σ0χ0, and by convention,∧
∅ = true = Φ(τ).
For the inductive case, let k > 0. We proceed by case analysis on the
rule applicable to compute (τ, 0, k). The ﬁrst rule cannot be applied, because
k > 0. The second rule, requiring hτ k−1, σk−1χk−1σkχk and w() = −1,
gives:
(τ) = (τ, 0, h)
Φ(τ [h..k])
−−−−−→ σkχk
By the induction hypothesis, Φ(τ [0..h]) =
∧
i=0..h−1 ϕi. Then:
Φ(τ) = Φ(τ [0..h]) ∧ Φ(τ [h..k]) = (
∧
i=0..h−1 ϕi) ∧ ϕh =
∧
i=0..h ϕi
The third rule in the deﬁnition of  is applicable in any other case, and it
gives:
(τ) = (τ, 0, k − 1)
Φ(τ [k−1..k])
−−−−−−−→ σkχk
By the induction hypothesis, Φ(τ [0..k − 1]) =
∧
i=0..h−1 ϕi. Then:
Φ(τ) = Φ(τ [0..k − 1]) ∧ Φ(τ [k − 1..k]) = (
∧
i=0..h−1 ϕi) ∧ ϕh =
∧
i=0..h ϕi
Definition A.5 We say that τ = σ0χ0  · · · σkχk is positive when:
∀i ∈ 1..k. w(τ, 0, i) ≥ 0
Similarly, we say that τ is strictly positive when > holds in place of ≥.
Lemma A.6 Let τ be a trace of length k. Then:
0τ k =⇒ (τ) = τ [0] −→ (τ, 1, k) (A.8)
Proof. For k = 0, we have that 0 τ 0, therefore (A.8) holds trivially. For
k > 0, we prove (A.8) as a corollary of the following, more general, result.
Let τ be a strictly positive trace, of length k > 0. Then:
(τ) = τ [0]
Φ(τ [0..1])
−−−−−→ (τ, 1, k) (A.9)
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We prove (A.9) by induction on the length of τ . For the base case, if k = 0
there is nothing to prove. For the inductive case, let k > 0. We proceed
by case analysis on the rule applicable to compute (τ, 0, k). The ﬁrst rule
cannot be applied, because k > 0. The second rule, requiring h τ k − 1,
τ [k − 1] τ [k] and w() = −1, gives:
(τ) = (τ, 0, h)
Φ(τ [h..k])
−−−−−→ τ [k] (A.10)
Consider τ [0..h]. Since h τ k − 1 and w(τ [k − 1]  τ [k]) = −1, if it were
h = 0 then w(τ, 0, k) = 0, which would contradict our assumption about τ
being strictly positive. Therefore, h > 0. Since any preﬁx of a strictly positive
trace is strictly positive itself, we can apply the induction hypothesis on τ [0..h]
to obtain:
(τ, 0, h) = τ [0]
Φ(τ [0..1])
−−−−−→ (τ, 1, h) (A.11)
Now consider τ [1..k]. Since h ≥ 1, the second rule in the deﬁnition of  gives:
(τ, 1, k) = (τ, 1, h)
Φ(τ [h..k])
−−−−−→ τ [k] (A.12)
Putting together (A.10), (A.11) and (A.12), we obtain:
(τ) = (τ, 0, h)
Φ(τ [h..k])
−−−−−→ τ [k]
= τ [0]
Φ(τ [0..1])
−−−−−→ (τ, 1, h)
Φ(τ [h..k])
−−−−−→ τ [k]
= τ [0]
Φ(τ [0..1])
−−−−−→ (τ, 1, k)
The third rule in the deﬁnition of  is applicable in any other case, and it
states:
(τ) = (τ, 0, k − 1)
Φ(τ [k−1..k])
−−−−−−−→ τ [k] (A.13)
If k = 1, by the ﬁrst rule in the deﬁnition of , it follows that (τ, 0, k−1) = τ [0]
and (τ, 1, k) = τ [k], so we are done. Otherwise, if k > 1 we can apply the
induction hypothesis on τ [0..k − 1] (a preﬁx of a strictly positive trace) to
obtain:
(τ, 0, k − 1) = τ [0]
Φ(τ [0..1])
−−−−−→ (τ, 1, k − 1) (A.14)
Now consider τ [1..k]. The second rule in the deﬁnition of  is not applicable
to compute (τ [1..k]) – otherwise it would have been applied also to compute
(τ [0..k]). Thus, the third rule gives:
(τ, 1, k) = (τ, 1, k − 1)
Φ(τ [k−1..k])
−−−−−−−→ τ [k] (A.15)
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Putting together (A.13), (A.14) and (A.15), we obtain:
(τ) = (τ, 0, k − 1)
Φ(τ [k−1..k])
−−−−−−−→ τ [k]
= τ [0]
Φ(τ [0..1])
−−−−−→ (τ, 1, k − 1)
Φ(τ [k−1..k])
−−−−−−−→ τ [k]
= τ [0]
Φ(τ [0..1])
−−−−−→ (τ, 1, k)
This concludes the proof of (A.9). To prove (A.8), we just need to show that
0 τ k implies that τ is strictly positive – indeed, Φ(τ [0..1]) = true follows
directly by deﬁnition 3.4. By deﬁnition A.1 we have that, for each j ∈ 1..k,
w(τ, j, k) < 1. Now, let i ∈ 1..k. Then:
w(τ, 0, i) = w(τ, 0, k)− w(τ, i, k) > 1− 1 = 0
Lemma A.7 Let τ be a positive trace on 〈G,Perm〉. Let:
(τ) = (σ0 : n0)χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕl−→ (σl : nl)χl
Let γ0 = Γ(σ0) ∪Dom(n0). If n0γ0χ0 ∈ N
, then there exists a path:
π = n0γ0χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕl−→ nlγlχl
in G such that w(π) = w(τ), and γi = Γ(σi) ∪ Dom(ni) for each i = 1..l.
Proof. Assume that τ consists of k steps: we proceed by induction on k. The
base case k = 0 requires τ = (σ0 : n0)χ0, which is positive. Since n0γ0χ0 ∈ N

by hypothesis, the path π is just the single node n0γ0χ0, and w(π) = 0 = w(τ).
For the inductive case, let k > 0, n0γ0χ0 ∈ N
. We proceed by case
analysis on the rule applicable to compute (τ, 0, k). The ﬁrst rule cannot be
applied, because k > 0. The second rule requires h τ k − 1, w(k) = −1,
and it gives:
(τ) = (τ, 0, h)
Φ(τ [h..k])
−−−−−→ σkχk
Consider ﬁrst the trace τ ′ = τ [0..h]. By deﬁnition A.5 it follows that each
preﬁx of a positive trace is positive: therefore, τ ′ is positive. Since the length
of τ ′ is h < k − 1 < k, and n0γ0χ0 ∈ N
, then the induction hypothesis gives
a path:
π′ = n0γ0χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕl−1
−−→ nl−1γl−1χl−1
with w(π′) = w(τ ′) and γi = Γ(σi) ∪ Dom(ni) for i = 1..l − 1.
Next, consider τ ′′ = τ [h..k − 1]. Since h τ k − 1, by deﬁnition A.1 we
have that, for each j ∈ h..k − 1, w(τ, j, k − 1) ≤ 1. Now, let i ∈ h..k − 1.
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Then:
w(τ, h, i) = w(τ, h, k − 1)− w(τ, i, k − 1) ≥ 1− 1 = 0
It follows that τ ′′ is positive. Let:
(τ ′′) = (σ′0 : n
′
0)χ
′
0
ϕ′
1−→ · · ·
ϕ′p
−→ (σ′p : n
′
p)χ
′
p
By lemma A.4, we have that:
(σ′0 : n
′
0)χ
′
0 = (τ
′′)[0] = τ ′′[0] = τ [h]
= τ ′[h] = (τ ′)[l − 1] = (σl−1 : nl−1)χl−1
(A.16)
Let γ′0 = Γ(σ
′
0) ∪ Dom(n
′
0). By (A.16), γ
′
0 = γl−1 = Γ(σl−1) ∪ Dom(nl−1). It
follows that n′0γ
′
0χ
′
0 = nl−1γl−1χl−1 ∈ N
. Since the length of τ ′′ is k−1−h < k,
we can apply the induction hypothesis to obtain a path:
π′′ = n′0γ
′
0χ
′
0
ϕ′
1−→ · · ·
ϕ′p
−→ n′pγ
′
pχ
′
p
with w(π′′) = w(τ ′′) = w(τ, h, k − 1) = 1 (because h τ k − 1), and γ
′
i =
Γ(σ′i) ∪ Dom(n
′
i) for i = 1..p.
By lemma A.4 and deﬁnition 3.3, 〈σ′0 : n
′
0, χ
′
0〉 = τ [h] call τ [h + 1]. So,
χ′0 = false, and τ [h + 1] is on the form σ
′
0 : n
′
0 : n, for some n ∈ N such
that n′0 −→ n. Since h τ k − 1, by lemma A.6 it follows that (τ
′′) =
τ [h] −→ (τ, h + 1, k − 1). Lemma A.4 also ensures that the ﬁrst element of
(τ, h+1, k− 1) is just τ [h+1]: then, (τ ′′) = [τ [h], τ [h+1], . . .], that implies
n = n′1 and σ
′
1 = σ
′
0 : n
′
0. Now, consider the ﬁrst edge in π
′′, i.e. n′0γ
′
0 −→ n
′
1γ
′
1.
Since w(π′′) = 1 = w(π′′[0..1]) and the weight of a path cannot decrease
by adding new nodes, then w(π′′[1..p]) = 0. Let ϕ =
∧
i=1..p ϕ
′
i. Then, by
deﬁnition 3.3, n′0γ
′
0 ϕ n
′
pγ
′
pχ
′
p.
Now, we have to deal with the two possible values of the label k. Consider
ﬁrst the case k = return. By lemma A.4, σ
′
p : n
′
p = τ [k−1] and σl : nl = τ [k].
Since k is a return transition, it follows that (n
′
p) = return, and σ
′
p : n
′
p
must be on the form σ′ : n′ : n′p for some σ
′ and n′. By lemma A.2, there exists
an index i ∈ 1..k − 2 such that i τ k − 1 and τ [i] = σ
′ : n′. Deﬁnition A.1
implies that, given a trace τ and an index j, there exists a unique index
i such that i τ j. Since h τ k − 1 by hypothesis, then h = i, and
σ′p = σ
′ : n′ = τ [i] = τ [h] = σ′0 : n
′
0. Therefore, the return rule applied at step
k instances to:
(n′p) = return n
′
0  nl
σ′0 : n
′
0 : n
′
p  σ
′
0 : nl
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Then, χl = false and γl = Γ(σl) ∪ Dom(nl) = Γ(σ
′
0) ∪ Dom(n
′
0) = γ
′
0. The
return rule instances to:
(n′p) = return n
′
0  nl n
′
0γ
′
0 ϕ n
′
pγ
′
p
n′0γ
′
0
ϕ
−→ nlγ
′
0
Therefore, the path π = π′
ϕ
−→ nlγl is in G
, and:
w(π) = w(π′) + w(n′0γ
′
0
ϕ
−→ nlγ
′
0) = 1 + 0
w(τ) = w(τ ′) + w(τ ′′) + w(σ′0 : n
′
0 : n
′
p  σ
′
0 : n
′
0) = 1 + 1− 1
Next, we consider the case k = propagate. By lemma A.4, σ
′
p : n
′
p =
τ [k − 1] and σl : nl = τ [k]. The propagate rule instances to:
n′p 
σ′p : n
′
p σ
′
p
With the same arguments used above, we deduce that σ′0 : n
′
0 = σ
′
p = σl : nl,
and γ′0 = γl. By the propagate rule:
n′0γ
′
0 ϕ n
′
pγ
′
p n
′
p 
n′0γ
′
0
ϕ
−→ n′0γ
′
0
As above, the path π = π′
ϕ
−→ nlγl is in G
, and w(π) = w(τ).
The third rule in the deﬁnition of  is applicable in any other case. Let
τ ′ = τ [0..k − 1] and ϕ = Φ(σk−1χk−1 k σkχk). The rule states that:
(τ) = (τ ′)
ϕ
−→ σkχk
Then, σkχk = (σl : nl)χl. By the induction hypothesis, there exists a path:
π′ = n0γ0χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕl−1
−−→ nl−1γl−1χl−1
with w(π′) = w(τ ′) and γi = Γ(σi)∪Dom(ni) for i = 1..l−1. By case analysis
on the value of the label k, we have:
• case [call ]. By the call rule:
(nl−1) = call nl−1 −→ nl
σl−1 : nl−1  σl−1 : nl−1 : nl
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Then, σl = σl−1 : nl−1, and χl−1 = χl = false. By deﬁnition 2.3:
γl = Γ(σl−1 : nl−1) ∪ Dom(nl)
= Γ(σl−1)↑nl−1 ∪ Dom(nl)
=
(
Γ(σl−1) ∪ Dom(nl−1)
)
↑nl−1 ∪ Dom(nl)
= γl−1↑nl−1 ∪ Dom(nl)
The call rule gives:
(nl−1) = call nl−1 −→ nl nl−1γl−1 ∈ N

nl−1γl−1 −→ nlγl
Then, π = π′ −→ nlγl is in G
, and w(π) = w(π′) + 1 = w(τ ′) + 1 = w(τ).
• case [pass ]. By the pass rule:
(nl−1) = check(P ) Γ(σl−1 : nl−1) 
Perm P nl−1  nl
σl−1 : nl−1  σl−1 : nl
Then, σl = σl−1 and χl−1 = χl = false. By deﬁnition 3.4, it follows that
ϕ = Γ(σl−1 : nl−1) 
 P . Since nl−1 is not privileged (constraint (1e)), then:
γl−1 = Γ(σl−1) ∪ Dom(nl−1) = Γ(σl−1 : nl−1)
Then, ϕ = γl−1 
 P , and by the pass rule:
(nl−1) = check(P ) nl−1γl−1 ∈ N
 nl−1  nl
nl−1γl−1
γl−1 P
−−−−→ nlγl−1
By constraint (1d), γl = Γ(σl) ∪ Dom(nl) = Γ(σl−1) ∪ Dom(nl−1) = γl−1.
Then, π = π′
γl−1 P
−−−−→ nlγl is in G
, and w(π) = w(π′) + 0 = w(τ ′) = w(τ).
• case [fail ]. By the fail rule:
(nl−1) = check(P ) Γ(σl−1 : nl−1) 
Perm P
σl−1 : nl−1  σl−1 : nl−1
Similarly to the previous case, ϕ = Γ(σl−1 : nl−1) 
 P = γl−1 
 P , and
σl : nl = σl−1 : nl−1, γl = γl−1. Then, by the fail rule:
(nl−1) = check(P ) nl−1γl−1 ∈ N

nl−1γl−1
γl−1 P
−−−−→ nl−1γl−1
M. Bartoletti et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 99 (2004) 49–86 73
Then, π = π′
γl−1 P
−−−−→ nlγl is in G
, and w(π) = w(τ).
• case [catch]. By the catch rule:
nl−1 nl
σl−1 : nl−1 σl−1 : nl
Here σl = σl−1. By constraint (1d), γl = γl−1, and, by deﬁnition 3.4,
ϕ = true. Then, by the catch rule:
nl−1γl−1 ∈ N
 nl−1 nl
nl−1γl−1 −→ nlγl−1
The path π = π′ −→ nlγl is in G
, and w(π) = w(π′)+0 = w(τ ′)+0 = w(τ).
Proof of Theorem 3.6 Let τ = [nε]  · · ·  〈σ : n, χ〉 be a trace on
〈G,Perm〉. Since τ cannot contain intermediate states on the form [] or [],
it follows that τ is positive. Let (τ) = [nε]
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕk−→ (σ : n)χ. Since
nε∅ ∈ N
, then lemma A.7 ensures that there exists a path π in G whose last
node is 〈n,Γ(σ) ∪ Dom(n), χ〉, and Φ(π) =
∧
i ϕi = Φ(τ) by lemma A.4.
Lemma A.8 Let 〈G,Perm〉 τ . Then:
Perm |= Φ(τ) (A.17a)
∀Perm′ |= Φ(τ). 〈G,Perm′〉 τ (A.17b)
Proof. We ﬁrst prove (A.17a), by induction on the length of τ . For the base
case τ = [] there is nothing to prove, because Φ([]) = true by convention.
For the inductive case, let k be the length of τ , and consider the last step
τ [k − 1]  τ [k] in the trace. According to deﬁnition 3.4, if  ∈ {pass , fail}
then Φ(τ [k − 1..k]) = true: then, Perm |= Φ(τ [0..k − 1]) ∧ true follows by the
induction hypothesis and by deﬁnition 3.5. If  = pass, then the last step of
τ is on the form:
(n) = check(P ) Γ(σ : n) 
Perm P n  m
σ : n σ : m
By deﬁnition 3.4, Φ(τ [k − 1..k]) = Γ(σ : n) 
 P . By deﬁnition 3.5:
Perm |= (Γ(σ : n) 
 P ) ∧ Φ(τ [0..k − 1])
⇐⇒ Γ(σ : n) 
Perm P ∧ Perm |= Φ(τ [0..k − 1])
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which follows by the premises of thepass rule and by the induction hypothesis.
The case  = fail is similar.
For (A.17b), let Perm′ |= Φ(τ). The only steps in the derivation which
are sensitive to the security policy are those labelled pass or fail . Let (n) =
check(P ), and σ : n pass σ : m be a transition on 〈G,Perm〉. Then, Γ(σ :
n) 
Perm P . Since Perm |= Φ(τ) by (A.17a), then deﬁnition 3.4 implies that
Perm |= Γ(σ : n) 
 P . Now, we have assumed that Perm′ |= Φ(τ), so
Perm′ |= Γ(σ : n) 
 P , too. Therefore, Γ(σ : n) 
Perm′ P , which enables
the transition σ : n pass σ : m also on 〈G,Perm〉. The case fail is treated
similarly.
Lemma A.9 Let π = n0γ0χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕk−→ nkγkχk be a path in G
, Perm |=
Φ(π) and 〈G,Perm〉 τ ′  〈σ0 : n0, χ0〉 for some τ
′ and σ0 s.t. γ0 = Γ(σ0) ∪
Dom(n0). Then, there exists a positive trace τ such that 〈G,Perm〉 τ
′
 τ ,
and:
(τ) = (σ0 : n0)χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕk−→ (σk : nk)χk (A.18a)
Moreover, w(π) = w(τ), Φ(π) = Φ(τ), and, for each i ∈ 1..k:
σi =
{
σi−1 : ni−1 if w(π[i− 1] −→ π[i]) = 1
σi−1 otherwise
(A.18b)
γi = Γ(σi) ∪Dom(ni) (A.18c)
Proof. By induction on the derivation of π. The base case requires π =
nεDom(nε), τ
′ = [], σ0 = [], n0 = nε and χ0 = false. Let τ = [nε]. Then,
〈G,Perm〉 τ ′ τ , and the other statements of the lemma hold trivially. For
the inductive case, we proceed by case analysis on the last rule used in the
derivation of π. We consider only the cases call , return and pass – the other
cases can be treated similarly.
• case [call ]. By the call rule:
(nk−1) = call nk−1γk−1 ∈ N
 nk−1 −→ nk
nk−1γk−1 −→ nk(γk−1↑nk−1) ∪ Dom(nk)
Then, ϕk = true and χk−1 = χk = false. By the induction hypothesis,
there exists a positive trace τ ′′ such that 〈G,Perm〉  τ ′  τ ′′, w(τ ′′) =
w(π[0..k − 1]), Φ(τ ′′) = Φ(π[0..k − 1]), and:
(τ ′′) = (σ0 : n0)χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕk−1
−−−→ σk−1 : nk−1
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By the call rule, we have:
(nk−1) = call nk−1 −→ nk
σk−1 : nk−1  σk−1 : nk−1 : nk
Let σk = σk−1 : nk−1 and τ = τ
′′
σk. The third rule in deﬁnition A.3 gives:
(τ) = (τ ′′) −→ σk : nk = (σ0 : n0)χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕk−→ (σk : nk)χk
This proves (A.18a). For (A.18b), note that σk = σk−1 : nk is coherent with
w(π[k − 1] −→ π[k]) = 1. For (A.18c), the induction hypothesis and def. 2.3
give:
γk = (γk−1↑nk−1) ∪Dom(nk)
=
(
(Γ(σk−1) ∪ Dom(nk−1))↑nk−1
)
∪ Dom(nk)
= (Γ(σk−1)↑nk−1) ∪ Dom(nk)
= Γ(σk) ∪ Dom(nk)
To conclude the proof of this case, note that the induction hypothesis gives:
w(π) = w(π[0..k − 1]) + 1 = w(τ ′′) + 1 = w(τ)
Φ(π) = Φ(π[0..k − 1]) ∧ true = Φ(τ ′′) = Φ(τ)
• case [return]. By the return rule, there exist n and γ such that:
(n) = return nk−1  nk nk−1γk−1 ϕk nγ
nk−1γk−1
ϕk−→ nkγk−1
Then, γk = γk−1 and χk = χk−1 = false. By the induction hypothesis, there
exists a positive trace τ0 (of length l0) such that 〈G,Perm〉 τ
′
 τ0, and:
w(τ0) = w(π[0..k − 1]) (A.19a)
Φ(τ0) = Φ(π[0..k − 1]) (A.19b)
(τ0) = (σ0 : n0)χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕk−1
−−−→ σk−1 : nk−1 (A.19c)
Moreover, for each i ∈ 1..k − 1:
σi =
{
σi−1 : ni−1 if w(π[i− 1] −→ π[i]) = 1
σi−1 otherwise
(A.19d)
γi = Γ(σi) ∪ Dom(ni) (A.19e)
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Consider the path π′′ used to derive nk−1γk−1 ϕk nγ. By deﬁnition 3.3,
nk−1 −→ ε(µ(n)), γ = (γk−1 ↑ nk−1) ∪ Dom(n), and π
′′ is on the form
nk−1γk−1 −→ π
′ for some π′ ∈ Π(ε(µ(n))γ, nγ) such that w(π′) = 0 and
Φ(π′) = ϕk. By the call rule, we can derive:
(nk−1) = call nk−1 −→ ε(µ(n))
σk−1 : nk−1  σk−1 : nk−1 : ε(µ(n))
By (A.19e), deﬁnition 2.3 and constraint (1d), we have that:
γ = (γk−1↑nk−1) ∪Dom(n)
=
(
Γ(σk−1) ∪ Dom(nk−1)
)
↑nk−1 ∪ Dom(ε(µ(n)))
= Γ(σk−1 : nk−1) ∪Dom(ε(µ(n)))
Then, we can apply the induction hypothesis to obtain a positive trace τ1
(of length l1) such that 〈G,Perm〉 τ
′
 τ0  τ1, and:
w(τ1) = w(π
′) = 0 (A.20a)
Φ(τ1) = Φ(π
′) = ϕk (A.20b)
(τ1) = (σ
′
0 : n
′
0)χ
′
0
ϕ′
1−→ · · ·
ϕ′h−→ (σ′h : n
′
h)χ
′
h (A.20c)
with σ′0 = σk−1 : nk−1, n
′
0 = ε(µ(n)), χ
′
0 = false, n
′
h = n and χ
′
h = false.
Moreover for each i ∈ 1..h− 1:
σ′i =
{
σ′i−1 : n
′
i−1 if w(π
′[i− 1] −→ π′[i]) = 1
σ′i−1 otherwise
(A.20d)
Since w(π′) = 0, and the weight of a path is non-decreasing, it follows
that w(π′[i] −→ π′[i + 1]) = 0 for each i ∈ 0..h − 1. Then, by (A.20d),
σ′h = σ
′
0 = σk−1 : nk−1. Thus, the return rule gives:
(n) = return nk−1  nk
σk−1 : nk−1 : n σk−1 : nk
Let τ = τ0 τ1 σk−1 : nk. We have just proved that 〈G,Perm〉 τ
′
 τ .
By (A.19a) and (A.20a), it follows that:
w(τ) = w(τ0) + w(σk−1 : nk−1  σk−1 : nk−1 : ε(µ(n)))
+ w(τ1) + w(σk−1 : nk−1 : n σk−1 : nk)
= w(τ0) + 1 + 0− 1
= w(π[0..k − 1]) + w(nk−1γk−1
ϕk−→ nkγk) = w(π)
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By (A.19b) and (A.20b), it follows that:
Φ(τ) = Φ(τ0) ∧ Φ(σk−1 : nk−1  σk−1 : nk−1 : ε(µ(n)))
∧ Φ(τ1) ∧ Φ(σk−1 : nk−1 : n σk−1 : nk)
= Φ(π[0..k − 1]) ∧ ϕk = Φ(π)
We now prove that τ is positive. Let i ∈ 0..l0 + l1 + 1. We have to consider
three cases. If i ∈ 0..l0 − 1, then w(τ, 0, i) = w(τ0, 0, i) ≥ 0 follows directly
from the fact that τ0 is positive. Otherwise, if i ∈ l0..l0 + l1, then, using also
the fact that τ1 is positive:
w(τ, 0, i) = w(τ0) + w(τ0[k − 1] τ1[0]) + w(τ1, 0, i− l0) ≥ 0
The last case (i = l0+l1+1), is subsumed by the fact that w(τ) = w(π) ≥ 0.
Let σk = σk−1. We have still to prove that:
(τ) = (σ0 : n0)χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕk−→ (σk : nk)χk
Recall that τ is on the form:
〈σ0 : n0, χ0〉 · · ·〈σl0 : nl0 , χl0〉〈σ
′
0 : n
′
0, χ
′
0〉 · · ·〈σ
′
l1
: n′l1 , χ
′
l1
〉σk : nk
For i ∈ 0..l1, let σl0+i = σ
′
i, nl0+i = n
′
i and χl0+i = χ
′
i. Let l = l0 + l1 + 1,
σl = σk, nl = nk and χl = false. Therefore, τ can be rewritten as:
〈σ0 : n0, χ0〉 · · · 〈σl : nl, χl〉
By (A.20a), w(τ, l0, l − 1) = 1 + w(τ1, 0, l1) = 1. Let i ∈ l0 + 1..l − 1. Since
τ1 is positive, we have that:
w(τ, i, l− 1) = w(τ, l0, l − 1)− w(τ, l0, i) = 1− (1 + w(τ1, 0, i)) ≤ 0
This proves that l0 = max{ i ∈ 0..l− 1 | w(τ, i, l− 1) = 1 }, i.e. l0 τ l− 1.
Since w(τ [l− 1..l]) = −1, the second rule in def. A.3 together with (A.19c)
give:
(τ) = (τ0)
Φ(τ [l0..l])
−−−−−→ σl : nl
= (σ0 : n0)χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕk−1
−−−→ σk−1 : nk−1
ϕk−→ σl : nl
Since nk−1  nk, constraint (1f) implies that it cannot be nk−1 −→ nk,
so w(π[k − 1] −→ π[k]) = 0. Then, (A.18b) is satisﬁed, because σk = σk−1.
Moreover, by constraint (1d) it follows that:
γk = γk−1 = Γ(σk−1) ∪ Dom(nk−1) = Γ(σk) ∪Dom(nk)
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• case [pass ]. By the pass rule:
(nk−1) = check(P ) nk−1γk−1 ∈ N
 nk−1  nk
nk−1γk−1
γk−1 P
−−−−→ nkγk−1
Then, γk = γk−1, ϕk = γk−1 
 P and χk−1 = χk = false. By the induction
hypothesis, there exists a positive trace τ ′′ such that 〈G,Perm〉τ ′τ ′′, and:
(τ ′′) = (σ0 : n0)χ0
ϕ1
−→ · · ·
ϕk−1
−−−→ σk−1 : nk−1
Moreover, w(τ ′′) = w(π[0..k − 1]) and Φ(τ ′′) = Φ(π[0..k − 1]). Since, by
assumption, Perm |= Φ(π) = Φ(π[0..k − 1]) ∧ (γk−1 
 P ), by deﬁnition 3.5
it follows that γk−1 
Perm P . Then, equation (A.18c) and constraint (1e)
imply that Γ(σk−1 : nk−1) 
Perm P . So we can apply the pass rule, that
gives:
(nk−1) = check(P ) Γ(σk−1 : nk−1) 
Perm P nk−1  nk
σk−1 : nk−1  σk−1 : nk
Let τ = τ ′′  σk = σk−1 : nk. The induction hypothesis gives:
w(π) = w(π[0..k − 1]) + 0 = w(τ ′′) + 0 = w(τ)
Φ(π) = Φ(π[0..k − 1]) ∧ (γk−1 
 P ) = Φ(τ
′′) ∧ (γk−1 
 P ) = Φ(τ)
The proofs for (A.18a)–(A.18c) are trivial.
Proof of Theorem 3.7 Let π = nε∅ −→ · · · −→ nγχ be a path on G
, with
Perm |= Φ(π). Let τ ′ = [], σ0 = [], n0 = nε, χ0 = false and γ0 = ∅. Then,
〈G,Perm〉τ ′〈σ0 : n0, χ0〉, and γ0 = Γ(σ0)∪Dom(n0). By lemma A.9, there
exists τ ′′ such that 〈G,Perm〉τ ′τ ′′〈σ : n, χ〉 and Φ(π) = Φ(τ ′′〈σ : n, χ〉).
Let τ = τ ′τ ′′. Then, 〈G,Perm〉τ 〈σ : n, χ〉 and Φ(π) = Φ(τ〈σ : n, χ〉).
Proof of Theorem 4.2 Consider ﬁrst the “if” part. By contradiction, as-
sume there exists a trace τ = [nε]  · · ·  σ : n on 〈G,Perm〉 such that
Γ(σ : n) 
 P . Then, by the fail rule, 〈G,Perm〉τσ : n. Let γ = Γ(σ : n).
By constraint (1e), γ = Γ(σ) ∪ Dom(n). By theorem 3.6, there exists a path
π ∈ Π(nγ) in G such that Φ(π) = Φ(τ). By lemma A.8, Perm |= Φ(π).
Since Φ(nγ) =
∨
{Φ(π) | π ∈ Π(nγ) }, then Perm |= Φ(nγ) – contradic-
tion.
For the “only if” part, let n be a redundant check for permission P , i.e.
Γ(σ : n) 
 P whenever 〈G,Perm〉 σ : n for some state σ. By contradiction,
assume there exist a context γ such that Perm |= Φ(nγ), i.e. there exists a
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path π ∈ Π(nγ) such that Perm |= Φ(π). (deﬁnition 3.2). By theorem 3.7,
there exist τ and σ such that 〈G,Perm〉  τ  σ : n, Γ(σ) ∪ Dom(n) = γ,
and Φ(τ  σ : n) = Φ(π). Moreover, the last step in the trace must be on
the form:
(n) = check(P ) Γ(σ : n) 
Perm P
σ : n σ : n
because the only other rule leading to a state on the form σ : n is propagate,
which however requires n being a call node (lemma A.2). Now, by deﬁni-
tion 3.4:
Φ(τ  σ : n) = Φ(τ) ∧
(
Γ(σ : n) 
 P
)
= Φ(τ) ∧ (γ 
 P )
Since Perm |= Φ(τ  σ : n), by deﬁnition 3.5 it follows that Perm |= Φ(τ)
and Perm |= γ 
 P . By constraint (1e), we have that γ = Γ(σ) ∪ Dom(n) =
Γ(σ : n). Then, Γ(σ : n) 
 P – contradiction with the assumption of n being
redundant.
Proof of Theorem 4.3 Let n = ε(µ(n)) and Perm |= Φ(nγ) for all nγ ∈ G.
By contradiction, assume that 〈G,Perm〉  σ : m for some σ and m ∈ µ(n).
Since µ(nε) has no entry points, it must be σ = []. So, σ is on the form σ
′ : n′.
Consider the trace τ ′ such that 〈G,Perm〉 τ ′  σ : m. By lemma A.2, there
exists an index i such that τ ′[i] = σ′ : n′ and n′ −→ n. Let τ = τ ′[0..i]σ : n,
and γ = Γ(σ) ∪ Dom(n). Then, lemma A.8 ensures that Perm |= Φ(τ), and,
by theorem 3.6, there exists a path π ∈ Π(nγ) such that Φ(π) = Φ(τ). It
follows that Perm |= Φ(nγ) – a contradiction.
Definition A.10 The eﬀect of inlining n˙ −→ n′ on context γ is deﬁned as:
Inl n˙(γ) =
{
γ if Dom(n′) /∈ γ
(γ \ Dom(n′)) ∪Dom(n˙) otherwise
Lemma A.11 Let n˙ be inlineable in G, and G˙ = inl n˙(G). Then, for each
state σ,
ΓG˙(inl n˙(σ)) = Inl n˙(ΓG(σ))
Proof. Let γ = ΓG(σ), σ˙ = inl n˙(σ) and γ˙ = ΓG˙(σ˙). We proceed by induction
on the size (number of nodes) of σ. The base case is σ = []. Then, σ˙ = [],
γ = γ˙ = ∅, and ∅ = Inl n˙(∅). For the inductive case, consider the last rule
used in the derivation of σ˙ = inl n˙(σ). We have the two following cases:
• if σ = σ′ : n′ and top(σ′) = n˙, then inl n˙(σ) = σ˙
′ : n′, where σ˙′ = inl n˙(σ
′).
Moreover, by condition (2b) of deﬁnition 4.4, it follows that n˙ −→ µ(n′). Let
γ′ = ΓG(σ
′), γ˙′ = ΓG˙(σ˙
′). We have to consider the following two subcases.
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If PrivG(n
′), then γ = {DomG(n
′)}. By deﬁnition 4.5, we have that
PrivG˙(n
′) and DomG˙(n
′) = DomG(n
′). Since n˙ −→ µ(n′), deﬁnition A.10
implies that:
Inl n˙(γ) = Inl n˙(DomG(n
′)) = DomG(n
′) = DomG˙(n
′) = γ˙
Otherwise, if ¬PrivG(n
′), then:
Inl n˙(γ) = Inl n˙(γ
′ ∪DomG(n
′)) by def. 2.3 (¬PrivG(n
′))
= Inl n˙(γ
′) ∪ Inl n˙(DomG(n
′)) by def. A.10
= γ˙′ ∪ Inl n˙(DomG(n
′)) by the ind. hyp.
= γ˙′ ∪ Inl n˙(DomG˙(n
′)) by def. 4.5
= γ˙′ ∪ DomG˙(n
′) by def. A.10
= γ˙ by def. 2.3 (¬PrivG˙(n
′))
• if σ = σ′ : n˙ : n′, then inl n˙(σ) = σ˙
′ : n′, where σ˙′ = inl n˙(σ
′). Note that, by
lemma A.2 and condition (2a) of deﬁnition 4.4, n˙ −→ µ(n′). Let γ′ = ΓG(σ
′)
and γ˙′ = ΓG˙(σ˙
′). We have to consider the following two subcases.
If PrivG(n
′), deﬁnition 4.5 states that PrivG˙(n
′) and DomG˙(n
′) = DomG(n˙).
Then, γ = DomG(n
′) and γ˙ = DomG˙(n
′), so deﬁnition A.10 implies:
Inl n˙(γ) = Inl n˙(DomG(n
′)) = DomG(n˙) = DomG˙(n
′) = γ˙
Otherwise, if ¬PrivG(n
′), there are two further subcases, according n˙ being
privileged or not. If PrivG(n˙), then PrivG˙(n
′) follows by deﬁnition 4.5, and:
Inl n˙(γ) = Inl n˙(DomG(n˙) ∪ DomG(n
′)) as PrivG(n˙), ¬PrivG(n
′)
= DomG(n˙) by def. A.10
= DomG˙(n
′) by def. 4.5
= γ˙ as PrivG˙(n
′)
Otherwise, if ¬PrivG(n˙), then:
Inl n˙(γ) = Inl n˙(γ
′ ∪DomG(n˙) ∪DomG(n
′)) as ¬PrivG(n˙), ¬PrivG(n
′)
= Inl n˙(γ
′) ∪ DomG(n˙) by def. A.10
= γ˙′ ∪ DomG(n˙) by the ind. hyp.
= γ˙′ ∪ DomG˙(n
′) by def. 4.5
= γ˙ as ¬PrivG˙(n
′)
Proof of Theorem 4.6 Let τ be on the form 〈σ0, χ0〉 · · · 〈σk, χk〉, with
σ0 = [], χ0 = false. Then, inl n˙(τ) is on the form 〈σ˙0, χ0〉 
n˙ · · ·n˙ 〈σ˙k, χk〉,
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where σ˙i = inl n˙(σi) for each i ∈ 0..k. We have to prove that:
〈σ0, χ0〉  · · ·  〈σk, χk〉 ⇐⇒ 〈σ˙0, χ0〉 
n˙ · · · n˙ 〈σ˙k, χk〉
Consider the forward implication ﬁrst. We proceed by case analysis on the
rule used to deduce σiχi  σi+1χi+1. We omit a detailed discussion of the
cases fail and catch , because they are treated similarly to pass and return ,
respectively.
• case [call ]:
(n) = call n −→ n′
σ : n σ : n : n′
Here σi = σ : n, σi+1 = σ : n : n
′, and χi = χi+1 = false. Let σ
′ : n =
inl n˙(σ : n) = σ˙i. If n = n˙, then rule 
n˙
call1 yields:
(n) = call n −→ n′ n = n˙
σ′ : n n˙ σ′ : n : n′
To show that σ˙i+i = σ
′ : n : n′ = inl n˙(σ : n : n
′) = inl n˙(σi+1), it suﬃces to
note that rule inl2 instances to:
inl n˙(σ : n) = σ
′ : n top(σ : n) = n˙
inl n˙(σ : n : n
′) = σ′ : n : n′
Otherwise, if n = n˙, then rules n˙call2 and inl3 give:
(n˙) = call n˙ −→ n′
σ′ : n˙ n˙ σ′ : n′
inl n˙(σ) = σ˙
inl n˙(σ : n˙ : n
′) = σ˙ : n′
To prove that σ′ = σ˙, assume ﬁrst that σ = []. Then, σ′ : n˙ = inl n˙([n˙]) = [n˙]
implies that σ′ = [], and σ˙ = inl n˙([]) = [],
Second, assume σ = σ′′ : n′′. Condition (2a) of deﬁnition 4.4 ensures that
n′′ = n˙, because, otherwise, it would be n˙ −→ µ(n˙). Then, rule inl2 gives:
inl n˙(σ
′′ : n′′) = σ˙ top(σ′′ : n′′) = n˙
inl n˙(σ
′′ : n′′ : n˙) = σ˙ : n˙
By assumption, it is also σ′ : n˙ = inl n˙(σ : n˙). Therefore, σ
′ = σ˙.
• case [return]:
(n′) = return n  m
σ : n : n′  σ : m
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Let σ′ : n′ = inl n˙(σ : n : n
′). We have to consider two subcases.
If n˙ −→ µ(n′), let σ˙ : n = inl n˙(σ : n). Then, lemma A.2 ensures that
n = n˙, hence rules inl2 and 
n˙
return1 give:
inl n˙(σ : n) = σ˙ : n top(σ : n) = n˙
inl n˙(σ : n : n
′) = σ˙ : n : n′
(n′) = return n  m n˙ −→ µ(n′)
σ˙ : n : n′ n˙ σ˙ : m
Then, σ˙ : m = inl n˙(σ : m) follows immediately by σ˙ : n = inl n˙(σ : n).
Otherwise, if n˙ −→ µ(n′), let σ˙ = inl n˙(σ). Lemma A.2 and condition (2b)
of deﬁnition 4.4 ensure that n = n˙. Then, rules inl3 and 
n˙
return2 give:
inl n˙(σ) = σ˙
inl n˙(σ : n˙ : n
′) = σ˙ : n′
(n′) = return n˙  m n˙ −→ µ(n′)
σ˙ : n′ n˙ σ˙ : m
To prove σ˙ : m = inl n˙(σ : m), observe that, since top(σ) = n˙ is ensured by
condition (2a), then rule inl2 instances to:
inl n˙(σ) = σ˙ top(σ) = n˙
inl n˙(σ : m) = σ˙ : m
• case [pass ]:
(n) = check(P ) ΓG(σ : n) 
Perm P n  m
σ : n σ : m
Let σ˙ : n = inl n˙(σ : n) and n˙ −→ n
′. By theorem 3.6 and constraint (1e),
there exist nγ ∈ G such that γ = ΓG(σ : n). We must consider two cases.
If Dom(n′) ∈ γ, then deﬁnition A.10 gives Inl n˙(γ) = γ. Therefore, by
lemma A.11:
ΓG˙(inl n˙(σ : n)) = Inl n˙(ΓG(σ : n)) = Inl n˙(γ) = γ
It follows that ΓG˙(σ˙ : n) 
Perm P , so the transition is also possible in 
n˙.
Otherwise, if Dom(n′) ∈ γ, then, by conditions (2a)–(2c) the state σ
must be on the form σ′ : n˙ : n′ : σ′′, for some σ′, σ′′ such that n˙ ∈ σ′′. By
lemma A.2, it follows that 〈G,Perm〉 σ′ : n˙. Consider the trace τ ′ = []
· · ·σ′ : n˙, and let γ˙ = ΓG(σ
′)∪Dom(n˙). Theorem 3.6 states that there exists
a path π′ ∈ Π(n˙γ˙) in G. By call , n˙γ˙ −→ n
′γ′′, where γ′′ = (γ˙ ↑ n˙)∪Dom(n′).
Let h be the rightmost index of σ′ : n˙ : n′ in τ , k be the rightmost index of
σ : n, and i ∈ h + 1..k. It follows that σi is on the form σ
′ : n˙ : n′ : σ′i, for
some σ′i = []. Then, w(τ, h, i) = |σ
′
i| > 0, which, according to deﬁnition A.5,
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means that the trace σ′ : n˙ : n′  · · · σ : n is positive. Therefore, we can
apply lemma A.7 to ﬁnd a path π ∈ Π(n′γ′′, nγ). This proves that n˙γ˙⇒ nγ.
Since all the premises to condition (2d) in deﬁnition 4.4 are satisﬁed, we
can conclude:
ΓG(σ : n) 
Perm P ⇐⇒ γ
′ ∪Dom(n′) 
Perm P by def. γ
⇐⇒ γ′ 
Perm P ∧ P ∈ Perm(Dom(n
′)) by def. 2.4
⇐⇒ γ′ 
Perm P ∧ P ∈ Perm(Dom(n˙)) by (2d)
⇐⇒ γ′ ∪Dom(n˙) 
Perm P by def. 2.4
⇐⇒ Inl n˙(γ) 
Perm P by def. A.10
⇐⇒ ΓG˙(inl n˙(σ : n)) 
Perm P by lemma A.11
⇐⇒ ΓG˙(σ˙ : n) 
Perm P by def. σ˙ : n
Therefore, ΓG˙(σ˙ : n) 
Perm P , and the transition σ˙ : n
n˙ σ˙ : m is possible.
Note that σ˙ : m = inl n˙(σ : m) immediately follows by σ˙ : n = inl n˙(σ : n).
• case [propagate]:
n′ 
σ : n′ σ
If n˙ −→ µ(n′), let σ˙ = inl n˙(σ). Lemma A.2 and condition (2a) ensure
that top(σ) = n˙. Then, rules inl2 and 
n˙
propagate1 give:
inl n˙(σ) = σ˙ top(σ) = n˙
inl n˙(σ : n
′) = σ˙ : n′
n′  n˙ −→ µ(n
′)
σ˙ : n′ n˙ σ˙
Otherwise, if n˙ −→ µ(n′), then lemma A.2 and condition (2b) imply that
σ = σ′ : n˙ for some σ′. Let σ˙ = inl n˙(σ
′). Then, by rules inl3 and 
n˙
propagate2 :
inl n˙(σ
′) = σ˙
inl n˙(σ
′ : n˙ : n′) = σ˙ : n′
n′  n˙ −→ µ(n
′)
σ˙ : n′ n˙ σ˙ : n˙
To prove that σ˙ : n˙ = inl n˙(σ), observe that, since top(σ
′) = n˙ is ensured by
condition (2a), then rule inl2 instances to:
inl n˙(σ
′) = σ˙ top(σ′) = n˙
inl n˙(σ
′ : n˙) = σ˙ : n˙
For the backward implication, we proceed by case analysis on the rule
used to deduce 〈σ˙i, xi〉  〈σ˙i+1, xi+1〉. The function inl is bijective: for each
inlined state σ˙, the original state can be recovered by inserting n˙ before each
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n′ occurring in σ˙ whenever n˙ −→ µ(n′). A case analysis on the rule used for
σ˙i 
n˙ σ˙i+1 gives:
• case [call1 ]:
(n) = call n −→ n′ n = n˙
σ′ : n n˙ σ′ : n : n′
Since inl is bijective, let σ : n be such that inl n˙(σ : n) = σ
′ : n. Then:
(n) = call n −→ n′
σ : n σ : n : n′
inl n˙(σ : n) = σ
′ : n top(σ : n) = n˙
inl n˙(σ : n : n
′) = σ′ : n : n′
follow by rules call and inl2 , respectively.
• case [call2 ]:
(n˙) = call n˙ −→ n′
σ′ : n˙ n˙ σ′ : n′
Let σ : n˙ be such that inl n˙(σ : n˙) = σ
′ : n˙. Then:
(n˙) = call n˙ −→ n′
σ : n˙ σ : n˙ : n′
inl n˙(σ) = σ
′
inl n˙(σ : n˙ : n
′) = σ′ : n′
follow by rules call and inl3 , respectively.
• case [return1 ]:
(n′) = return n  m n˙ −→ µ(n′)
σ˙ : n : n′ n˙ σ˙ : m
Since n˙ −→ µ(n′), by condition (2a) it follows that n = n˙. So, let σ : n : n′
be such that inl n˙(σ : n : n
′) = σ˙ : n : n′. Then:
(n′) = return n  m
σ : n : n′  σ : m
inl n˙(σ : n) = σ˙ : n top(σ : n) = n˙
inl n˙(σ : n : n
′) = σ˙ : n : n′
follow by rules return and inl2 , respectively, while σ˙ : m = inl n˙(σ : m)
immediately follows by the fact that σ˙ : n = inl n˙(σ : n).
• case [return2 ]:
(n′) = return n˙  m n˙ −→ µ(n′)
σ˙ : n′ n˙ σ˙ : m
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Let σ : n′ be such that inl n˙(σ : n
′) = σ˙ : n′. Since n˙ −→ µ(n′), lemma A.2
and condition (2b) give that top(σ) = n˙, i.e. σ = σ′ : n˙ for some σ′. Then:
(n′) = return n˙  m
σ′ : n˙ : n′  σ′ : m
inl n˙(σ) = σ˙
inl n˙(σ : n˙ : n
′) = σ˙ : n′
follow by rules return and inl3 , respectively, while σ˙ : m = inl n˙(σ : m)
immediately follows by the fact that σ˙ = inl n˙(σ).
• case [propagate1 ]:
n′  n˙ −→ µ(n
′)
σ˙ : n′ n˙ σ˙
Let σ : n′ be such that inl n˙(σ : n
′) = σ˙ : n′.
n′ 
σ : n′ σ
inl n˙(σ) = σ˙ top(σ) = n˙
inl n˙(σ : n
′) = σ˙ : n′
follow by rules propagate and inl2 , respectively.
• case [propagate2 ]:
n′  n˙ −→ µ(n
′)
σ˙ : n′ n˙ σ˙ : n˙
Let σ : n′ be such that inl n˙(σ : n
′) = σ˙ : n′. Since n˙ −→ µ(n′), by
lemma A.2 and condition (2b) there exists a σ′ such that σ = σ′ : n˙. Then:
n′ 
σ : n′ σ
inl n˙(σ
′) = σ˙
inl n˙(σ
′ : n˙ : n′) = σ˙ : n′
follow by rules propagate and inl3 , respectively, while σ˙ : n˙ = inl n˙(σ) imme-
diately follows by the fact that inl n˙(σ
′) = σ˙.
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